W
ith apologies and gratitude to J.K. Rowling, this issue's Backspace is devoted to defense against the dark forces on the Internet. As readers of the Harry Potter books might recall, Harry is persuaded that it isn't enough to only study the dark arts to fully understand and defend against them. Rather, he believes it necessary to gain experience by practicing defenses against actual adversaries. However, some specialists in the academic world who have devoted their careers to teaching programmers how attacks work believe it's sufficient to dissect and understand the mechanisms of attack but not to practice attacks. Gene "Spaf" Spafford at Purdue University vigorously defends this position, and has roughly 25 years of teaching experience to back up his argument.
As readers of this column will know, I'm strongly persuaded that we learn best by actually doing. I'm not suggesting that students should be turned loose on the Internet to attack it in the wild! However, in a firewalled "demilitarized zone," constructing viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, using them to attack various systems that are confined in this safe zone, and observing the results can be very instructive. We learn how easy it is to obtain and deploy various attack tools or how hard it is to create a self-sustaining virus or worm that can evade antivirus and other detectors. Moreover, to the extent that we can instrument the systems under attack, we can see more precisely how attacks work and how to devise defenses against them. Analyzing packet traces and observing changes in the internal state of systems under attack (such as new process spawning) can provide in-depth and concrete examples of malware's dynamics.
Spaf and I (among several others who commented on an early draft of this article) aren't all that far apart in our views -I respect the point he makes that careful disarticulation of the mechanisms of attack and defense can be very enlightening and, indeed, necessary to appreciate what actually happens. But I believe there is value in actually using the tools and constructing the weapons and applying them (again, in a confined space). You learn how to detect a defense and work around it or to identify vulnerabilities and exploit them.
I can readily imagine some readers reacting to this proposition: "Are you crazy? You would be training evil Internet ninjas!" My response to this is by analogy. Suppose you have a cadre of doctors who intend to become surgeons. I imagine that most patients, faced with surgery, will want to know how successful the surgeon has been in previous execution of the proposed procedure. Would-be surgeons study the human body using cadavers and even practice some procedures this way, but they also learn by doing -that is, by operating on live patients in a controlled (supervised) setting. The analogy might not be precise, and in any case, isn't complete. The real point of this essay is that to produce software that's resistant to attack, we must understand how the attacks work, what vulnerabilities are exploited, and how to create software that limits opportunities for exploitation.
Moreover, it's vital to see software as part of an ecosystem. Most computer systems are made up of many parts and layers: the underlying hardware, the kernel (maybe a hypervisor), the operating system, virtual memory management, the file system, and, of course, a wide variety of applications that might or might not interact. With the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, we now have browsers that interact with servers on the Internet, and interaction between the software of webpages through adjacent execution in browsers, often with malicious intent (think cross-site scripting, for example).
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It isn't enough to understand in some deep way how attacks can be and are mounted or how they evade defenses. Ultimately, in the cat and mouse game of attacker and victim on the Internet, we must find the attackers and identify the victims. In many cases, the latter are unaware that they've been infected. Often, equipment appears to users to function as normal despite spewing viruses, worms, and other malware. Nor is detecting infection so simple. The infecting software might be hidden in binary programs that have adopted the names of normal software components for the species of computer system the victim is using. It might lurk for long periods, responding to obscure signals originating from more than one place on the Internet over different communication paths and protocols. Even trying to observe the source and destination of packet traffic to and from the infected computer might not reveal the source of botnet control.
This line of reasoning draws us to the view that forensic tools are critically necessary to identify not only an infection but possibly also its origin. Many tools of the intelligence community, including human intelligence, could prove necessary to truly track down malware's origins. The Conficker (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Conficker) and Stuxnet (http:// en.w i k iped ia.org/w i k i/St u x net) worms have eluded identification as to origin and control thus far. In addition to learning how attacking software works and how attackers can identify and exploit vulnerabilities, it's clearly vital to develop forensic tools to identify infections and their sources. This is especially true if a national or international regime evolves in which such attacks are considered criminal or even national security threats. Training in the creation and use of forensic tools then seems to be an important complement to learning about the implementation and use of attacking mechanisms and defenses against them.
These thoughts lead me to conclude that serious computer science curricula must incorporate these themes (attack, defense, and analysis) in their scope if we are to expect programmers to write software that can defend itself against persistent offensive attacks. It should be obvious that the complex, layered software environment of today's Internet-enabled systems and devices has many potential vulnerabilities and that an application programmer can't be responsible for eradicating those found in the operating system, the browser, the subroutine library, and so on. Indeed, the entire suite of software that makes up an operating and application environment must be seen as an ecosystem in need of serious curation (not to say, a "cure"!).
I
f ever there were a time to en courage basic additions to our computer science curriculum, it seems to be now. Some programs might fall within the "Defense against the Dark Arts" umbra, and they should be applauded. Where they're absent, they must be instantiated. To proceed otherwise is to release naïve programmers into the wild whose software will suffer the consequences, and we, the users, will pay the price for that.
